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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, we conduct a longitudinal study of women’s progress on French corporate boards 
of directors. We particularly focus on the extent to which women directors have circumvented the 
glass ceiling. Using a sample of SBF 120 companies over a 10-year period from 2000 to 2009, our 
results provide evidence of a significant increase in the number of women on French corporate 
boards. However, the corporate glass ceiling hypothesis is consistently rejected whatever the 
considered measure of female directors; i.e., the number of board seats held by women, the 
number of firms with a critical mass of female directors, and the number of directorships held by 
each women director. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ver the period 2000-2009, the average participation rate of women in the labor market increased from 
60 to 64 percent across the European Union’s 27 Members States. More specifically, in France, it went 
up from 60.3 to 64.9 percent.
1
 However, despite this notable progress, women remain under-represented 
in senior or executive positions (ILO, 2009).
2
 This lack of female representation on corporate boards of directors, 
which is commonly referred to as glass ceiling in practice and past academic studies, seems to be a global 
phenomenon because women on corporate boards (WOCB) represents less than 15% of board members in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and many European countries (Dang & Vo, 2012).
3
 Morrison et 
al. (1987) describe the glass ceiling as a “transparent barrier that keeps women from rising above a certain level in 
corporations. It applies to women as a group who kept from advancing higher because they are women.” In general, 
the metaphor of “glass ceiling” implies the existence of a visible or an invisible barrier that prevents the vertically 
mobility of women. Below this barrier, women are able to get promoted, and beyond this barrier, they are unable. 
Studies including, among others, Daily et al. (1999), and Arfken et al. (2004) have put forward this argument to 
explain the under-representation of women in the boardrooms. 
 
Removing the glass ceiling may make good business sense for two main reasons. First and foremost, the 
glass ceiling can lead to disillusionment and higher turnover among talented women who may have acquired 
valuable firm-specific knowledge and whose abilities are valuable to the organization (Powell, 1999). Second, 
perpetuating this established fact may signal a bad business culture to corporate stakeholders as it is related to how 
an organization treats and promotes its employees overall. According to Pfeffer (1981), if functionally irrelevant 
factors are used to exclude women from top management positions, both women and men in lower management 
levels could jeopardize their desire to remain with the organization. 
                                                          
1 See European Labor Force Survey database (Eurostat); the report is accessible at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/lfs. 
2 International Labor Organization (ILO), March 2009, Global Employment Trends for Women. 
3 Excluding the Scandinavian countries. 
O 
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Over recent decades, considerable attention has been given to the question of whether women are able to 
shatter the glass ceiling and to make inroads in the boardroom. Past studies have examined this issue in a wide range 
of countries using various methodologies and measures of women’s representation on corporate boards (e.g., Dang 
& Vo, 2012; Terjesen et al., 2009; and references therein). Empirical investigations conducted in countries such as 
the U.S., UK, Canada, and Australia, among others, show that women are in minority on corporate boards, 
suggesting that they are tokens and that the glass ceiling still exists until now. Regarding France, we document that 
if women account for 52.4% of the labor force (INSEE, 2012), they only hold, among the 40 largest companies of 
the French stock market (CAC40 companies), 8.5% of board seats.
4
 It is also important to note that only a few 
studies have devoted to the investigation of the WOCB issue in the French context, while this country naturally 
differs from the other countries in terms of institutional and legal backgrounds as well as firms’ specific 
characteristic. To the best of our knowledge, only three studies have examined this phenomenon through the 
business case for board gender (Belghiti-Mahut & Lafont, 2010) and the organizational predictors of WOCB lens 
(Moulin & Point, 2012; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2012). 
 
In this article, we contribute to the related literature by examining women’s progress on French corporate 
boards and the extent to which women have shattered the glass ceiling. Specifically, we conduct a longitudinal study 
over the 10-year period from 2000 to 2009 for a sample of SBF 120 companies, to test the proposition that increased 
women’s representation on boards is likely to provide strong evidence of women having circumvented the glass 
ceiling. Our approach is based on the theoretical perspective discussed in Terjesen et al. (2009), which states that the 
influence of female directors can be analyzed at the board level and its composition. By investigating the glass 
ceiling phenomenon over a relatively long period (ten years) instead of a cross-sectional study at a single point in 
time, our analysis allows us to examine the dynamic changes in gender diversity practices within the French context. 
The remainder of this article is organized as following. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature devoted to 
the progression of WOCB. Section 3 presents the methodology used, sources of information and sample data. 
Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS 
 
This section reviews the scientific literature published in leading financial, management, and strategic 
journals from 1990 through 2013 devoted to women’s representation on corporate boards.5 We set arbitrary the year 
1990 as the starting point for our analysis. However, to our best knowledge, no studies before 1990 have ever 
examined this issue (theoretically and empirically). In order to identify relevant articles, we perform queries on 
bibliographic databases (such as EBSCO Business Source Premier and ScienceDirect) choosing all academic articles 
that the terms “women” and “board of directors” (or “board”) in the title, the abstract, or the keywords. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the empirical studies we retrieve within the financial, management, and strategic 
literature. Specifically, we present their main results on the progression of female director representation in 
corporate boards. 
 
Table 1: Women’s Representation on Corporate Boards: Empirical Evidence 
Article 
Data (Country & 
Study Period) 
Main Results 
Conyon & Mallin 
(1997) 
UK (FTSE 350
(a)
), 
1995 
In 1995, women held 2.49% of the FTSE board seats. This figure is slightly higher 
for the FTSE 100 companies with 3.65%. 
Overall, 20.86% of the FTSE 350 companies had at least one woman on the 
corporate board. Among the FTSE 100 companies, this ratio stood at 40.00% and 
13.20% for the Mid-250 companies. 
Burke (1999) Canada, 1996 
In 1996, the average top 1000 Canadian board of directors had 8.5 members, of 
whom 8.1 men and 0.4 women. 
 
 
                                                          
4 INSEE stands for Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, which is the French National Institute for Statistics and 
Economics Studies. INSEE, 2012, Femmes et hommes – Regards sur la parité, Paris: Insee Références. 
5 In this case, we do not take into consideration the results published by private organizations (such as Catalyst) or public ones (e.g., European 
Commission). 
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Table 1 cont. 
Daily et al. (1999) 
USA (Fortune 500
(b)
), 
1987 & 1996 
In 1987, on average, 42.6% of the Fortunes companies had women on their corporate 
board. In 1996, this ratio stood at 81.2%. 
Moreover, the average board in 1996 had 1.2 women compared with 0.54 women in 
1987. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Singh et al. (2001) 
UK (FTSE 100
(c)
), 
1999 & 2000 
Women held 5.81% of the FTSE 100 board seats in 2000 and 6.29% in 1999. 
In 1999, 64.0% of the FTSE 100 companies had at least one female director on 
corporate board, but this went down to 58.0% in 2000. Specifically, 13% of firms had 
at least 2 WOCB, compared with 12% in 1999. 
Note that only one woman held three directorships among FTSE companies, whilst 
10 female directors held two FTSE directorships. 
Arfken et al. (2004) 
USA (Publicly traded 
companies in 
Tennessee), 1996 & 
2002 
In 2002, on average, women held 5.8% of board seats of Tennessee companies 
compared with 5.4% in 1996. 
In their original study (Arfken et al., 1998), only 25% of companies, in 1996, had at 
least one woman on corporate board. In 2002, this figure stood at 38%. 
Singh & 
Vinnicombe (2004) 
UK (FTSE 100
(b)
), 
2001 & 2002 
Women held 7.2% of directorships in 2002, up from 6.4% in 2001. 
The number of companies with female directors among the UK’s top 100 firms had 
gone from 64% in 1999 to 57% in 2001, increase to 61% in 2002. 
None of the FTSE 100 companies had more than three female directors. 6 firms had 
20-27% WOCB, compared with only one in 2000. Finally, 28 FTSE 100 companies 
had 10-19% WOCB, and 27 firms had 5-9% female representation on their boards in 
2002. 
Carter et al. (2003) 
USA (Fortune 
1000
(d)
), 1997 
Women held 9.6% of Fortune 1000 board seats in 1997. The average board size is 
nearly 11, of whom, 1.1 are women. 46.9% of these companies had at least one 
woman on corporate boards, while 24.8% did not have any WOCB. 
Farrell & Hersch 
(2005) 
USA (Fortune 500
(b)
 
Service 500
(e)
), 
1990-1999 
Women held 12.2% of Fortune 500 and Service 500 board seats in 1999 and 7.4% in 
1990 (with 8.2% in 1994). The average number of WOCB increased from 0.74 in 
1990 to 1.39 in 1999. 
In 1990, in average, the percentage of firms without WOCB in 1990 is 47.0%. This 
figure, by 1999, fells significantly to 12.6% (1994: 27.6%). 
In 1990, 36.4% of the firms had only one woman on corporate board, 13.6% had two 
women on the board, and 2.9% had at least 3 WOCB, compared with respectively 
45.8%, 33.6%, and 8.0% in 1999. 
Finally, despite a decrease in board size (from 12.1 in 1990 to 11.3 in 1999), the 
representation of women increased significantly. 
Brammer et al. 
(2007) 
UK (FTSE All 
Share
(f)
), 2002 
In 2002, 37% of the firms listed on the LSE had at least one female director. 
The average board size consists of 8.4 men, of whom, 0.5 is woman. 
Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera 
(2008) 
Spain (Non-financial 
firms listed Bolsa de 
Madrid
(g)
), 1995-2000 
Over the period, women held 3.3% of board seats of largest Spanish companies. Only 
23.7% of Spanish-quoted firms have one or more WOCB. 
Adams & Ferreira 
(2009) 
USA (S&P 500, S&P 
MidCaps, and S&P 
Small Cap), 1996-
2003 
Over the period, women held 10.4% of board seats among companies in the S&P 
indexes. This ratio has increased by 25% over time, with 8.1% in 1996. 
The proportion of S&P companies having only one woman on their boards remained 
unchanged throughout the analysis period at 40%. 
Carter et al. (2010) 
USA (S&P 500), 
1998-2002 
The average number of female directors over the period 1998-2002 is 1.30, with an 
average board size of 11.2 directors. 
Simpson et al. 
(2010) 
USA (S&P 1500), 
2003-2007 
On average, women held 14.5% board seats of S&P 500 companies (2003-2007). 
The authors also find that the percentage of board seats held by women has increased 
from 10.4% (in 1998) to 14.8% (in 2007). 
About 47% of the S&P 500 companies had at least one woman on corporate board, in 
2007. But only nearly 27% for the S&P MidCaps and S&P 600 SmallCap companies. 
The difference in the means between each group is statically significant. 
Nekhili & Gatfaoui 
(2013) 
France (SBF 120), 
2000-2004 
Women held 7.20% of SBF 120 board seats in 2004 and 6.27% in 2000. In 2004, the 
number of SBF 120 companies with no WOCB represents more than 50%. About 
30% of firms had only one woman on their boards, while 20% had two women on 
more on the board of directors. 
(a) The FTSE 350 index is a market capitalization weighted market index that gathers the largest 350 companies by capitalization listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). (b)The Fortune 500 is an annual list compiled and published by Fortune magazine that ranks the top 500 U.S. 
companies ranked by revenue. (c)The FTSE 100 companies comprises the 100 largest companies on the LSE. (d)The magazine Fortune compiles in 
a similar manner the 1000 largest U.S. companies in terms of revenues. (e)In 1990, the magazine Fortune had two separate lists: The Fortune 500 
tracked the largest U.S. industrial companies and the Service 500 tracked the largest U.S. non-industrial companies (Farrell & Hersch, 2005). 
(f)This index represents over 90% of the market capitalization of all companies listed on the LSE (Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 2007). (g)It is 
the largest and most international of Spain stock exchanges. 
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As we can see in Table 1, while previous studies have generally documented the progression of women’s 
representation in corporate boards for various countries, the number of seats held by women may not be sufficient 
enough to have a significant influence in the board activities and firm performance. This under-representation 
suggests that women in management and in the boardrooms are almost always in the token position (Kanter, 1977). 
Following the critical mass theory (Granovetter, 1978; Kanter, 1977), women directors influence board decisions 
only when their representation reaches a certain threshold, or a “critical mass.” Konrad et al. (2008) suggest that the 
critical mass of women is reached when boards of directors have at “least three women.” In this case, women’s 
voices and ideas are taken into account in the boardroom. In this study, we also examine these theoretical arguments 
by using a dataset from France over the last decade. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We gather the information on corporate gender diversity from five sources of information: company’s 
annual reports, Who’s Who, Factiva, Diane, and the Internet. All annual reports were downloaded from companies’ 
websites. In the biography section, there is information regarding directors’ names, age (or birth date), education, 
function and position, and year of appointment. We crosscheck or complete all collected information by using 
Who’s Who which is a biographical dictionary that lists the people who matter in France, Factiva which generally 
publishes director appointments, and the Diane database (Bureau van Dijk). The Internet provides us with 
information not covered by the other sources. Based on these sources of information, we reconstruct the composition 
of director boards as of 31 December 2000, 2004, and 2009. 
 
Our sample data consist of the companies listed in the SBF 120 stock market index of Euronext Paris at the 
end of fiscal years 2000, 2004, and 2009. This market index gathers the 120 largest companies by market 
capitalization and by trading volume on NYSE Euronext Paris. The final sample includes 104, 112, and 120 in 2000, 
2004, and 2009, respectively. We could not include all the 120 companies in 2000 and 2004 due to the unavailability 
of some annual reports. The choice of this index is explained by our ambition to conduct an investigation at a scale 
similar to that of existing Anglo-Saxon studies, which all use samples of large firms. For instance, Daily et al. 
(1999) analyze the US firms belonging to the “Fortune 500” corporations, while Sealy et al. (2009) study the British 
companies included in the FTSE 100 Index. It is worth mentioning that our study stands prior the vote of the law 
Copé-Zimmermann in 2011, which requires the presence of at least 40% of female directors in corporate boards. 
Thus, our analysis enables us to examine the progression of women on corporate boards in an unregulated context of 
gender diversity. 
 
Following Hillman et al. (2002), we investigate the glass ceiling hypothesis for French corporate boards by 
performing the t-test and the Wilcoxon test. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Similar to Daily et al. (1999), and Simpson et al. (2010), we analyze women’s progress in corporations by 
using two common measures: (i) the proportion of firms having at least one woman in the boardroom; and (ii) the 
proportion of board seats held by women. 
 
Table 2 shows that, in 2009, 68.3% of the companies listed on the SBF 120 index have at least one woman 
on their boards, compared to 40% and 49% in 2000 and 2004, respectively. Over one decade, this proportion 
increased about 69%. The difference in the means between 2009 and 2000 is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that more SBF 120 companies have appointed at least one female director in their corporate boards. The 
mean difference between 2004 and 2000 is, however, not significant. 
 
Table 2: Proportion of SBF 120 Companies with One or More Women Directors 
Year N Mean Standard deviation T-test Wilcoxon 
2000 103 40.38 49.30   
2004 112 50.43 50.22 1.49 1.49 
2009 120 68.33 46.71 4.33
***
 4.19
***
 
Period 2004-2009 2.83
***
 2.79
***
 
Data are derived from the own calculation of the authors. The t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test in each year examine whether the average proportion of board 
seats held by women among SBF 120 companies in 2004 and 2009 is significantly different from that of the year 2000. (***), (**), and (*) indicates significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 3 shows that women held 9.3% of the SBF 120 board seats in 2009, compared to 6.1% and 7.0% in 
2000 and 2004, respectively. Thus, the proportion of board seats held by women to total board seats increased 53% 
over the period 2000-2009. This increase is statistically significant at the 1% level for the year 2009 against the year 
2000, but insignificant for the year 2004 against the year 2000. Again, the findings point to the higher representation 
of female directors in corporate boards. 
 
Table 3: Proportion of Board Seats Held by Women Among SBF 120 Companies 
Year N Mean Standard deviation T-test Wilcoxon 
2000 103 6.11 10.01   
2004 112 7.18 9.19 0.82 1.28 
2009 120 9.37 8.92 2.56*** 3.59*** 
Period 2004-2009 1.86*** 2.36*** 
Data are derived from the own calculation of the authors. The sample unit is the board seat for a company, not a particular director. If a director 
serves on two or more boards, that individual director will be counted more than once in the computed numbers in this table. The t-test and the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test in each year examine whether the average proportion of board seats held by women among SBF 120 companies in 2004 
and 2009 is significantly different from that of the year 2000. (***), (**), and (*) indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
The analysis based on Tables 2 and 3 so far provides only surface information. It may fail to support any 
evidence or provide a clear-cut conclusion that women have shattered the glass ceiling. Therefore, we propose to go 
further into our analysis of women’s progress on French corporate boards by analyzing three additional dimensions, 
as suggested by Sealy et al. (2009): (i) the number of board seats held by women; (ii) the number of firms with a 
critical mass of female directors on boards; and (iii) the number of directorships held by each female director. 
 
A close look at the figures in Table 4 reveals that 134 board seats are held by women in 2009 for the whole 
sample, against only 68 in 2000 and 82 in 2004. The ratio of board seats held by women to total board seats is 
9.41%, compared with nearly 6% in 2000. On average, one female director is on the board of each SBF 120 
company for the year 2009, compared with 0.65 in 2000. Finally, in 2009, the number of female directors on French 
corporate boards rose from 42 in 2000 to 82 in 2009. The results from the t-test applied to the differences in number 
of seats held by women and percentage change across years indicate that the increase in level and percentage 
between 2009 and 2000 is significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4: Evolution of the Number of Female Directors 
Year 2000 2004 2009 
Total number of seats 1,220 1,281 1,424 
Seats held by women 68 82 134*** 
Percentage 5.57 6.40 9.41*** 
Board size 11.87 11.24 11.87 
Average number of female directors 0.65 0.74 1.12 
Data are derived from the own calculation of the authors. The sample unit is the board seat for a company, not a particular director. If a director 
serves on two or more boards, that individual director will be counted more than once in the computed numbers in this table. The t-test is used to 
measure the evolution of the number of female directors with 2000 as a pivotal year. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
We now turn to the critical mass of female directors on French corporate boards between 2000 and 2009. 
Table 5 shows that in 2009, nearly one third of SBF 120 companies have no women on boards. The proportion of 
SBF 120 companies having no female directors on boards decreased significantly at conventional levels over the 
period. The majority of the firms of our sample have only one woman on board (42.5% in 2009, compared with 
nearly 25% in 2000). The difference in the means is statistically significant. However, the number of firms with at 
least two women directors rises over the sample period: 25.8% in 2009, compared with 16.4% in 2000. This increase 
is only significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5: Number of Firms with a Critical Mass of Female Directors 
Number of Female Directors 
2000 2004 2009 
Number As % Number As % Number As % 
No female director 62 59.62 57 50.89** 39 31.67*** 
One female director 25 24.04 40 35.71* 51 42.50*** 
Two female directors 9 8.65 9 8.04 17 14.17 
More than two female directors 8 7.69 6 5.36 14 11.67 
Data are derived from the own calculation of the authors. The sample unit is the board seat for a company, not a particular director. If a director 
serves on two or more boards, that individual director will be counted more than once in the computed numbers in this table. The t-test is used to 
measure the critical mass of female directors with 2000 as a pivotal year. (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
We now look at the number of directorships held by female directors over the period 2000-2009. 
Specifically, we restrict our analysis to the directorships of the SBF 120 companies and focus on the “elite social 
networks,” as suggested by D'Aveni and Kesner (1993). Indeed, this core elite group represents the “inner circles” 
among director elite. These directors differ significantly from the larger categories of directors with respect to their 
social characteristics and their institutional affiliation (Allen, 1978; Useem & Karabel, 1986). This is particularly 
prevalent in the French context as (Bourdieu, 1996) emphasizes. Indeed, they are graduated from an elite institution 
(Grande École) and have spent several years on the labor market within the civil services (Grands Corps d’État) 
(Nguyen, 2012). 
 
The analysis of Table 6 shows that in 2009, among the 115 female directors, 100 (or 87%) hold a single 
SBF 120 companies directorship; more than 10% (or 15 women) had two or more directorships. We also note that 
these figures remain relatively stable over the study period. 
 
Table 6: Breakdown of the Number of Directorships Held by Women in SBF 120 Companies 
 2000  2004  2009  
 Number As % Number As % Number As % 
One directorship 44 83.02 55 87.30 100 86.96 
Two directorships 6 11.32 4 6.35 13 11.30 
More than two directorships 3 5.66 4 6.35 2 1.74 
Data are derived from the own calculation of the authors. The t-test is used to measure the breakdown of the number of of directorships held by 
women with 2000 as a pivotal year. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The primary objective of this study is to examine women’s progress on French corporate boards over the 
period 2000-2009. Our findings show some intriguing facts regarding the evolution of corporate gender diversity in 
the French boardrooms, which precedes the promulgation of the law requiring a minimum quota of female directors. 
First, we find a significant increase of women on French corporate boards during the period 2000-2009, suggesting 
that women have been able to shatter the glass ceiling. We also notice that the number of board seats held by at least 
a female director as well as the proportion of female director seats to total board seats have significantly increased 
over the period 2004-2009. Before this period, the progress of women in the boardroom is relatively marginal, as 
indicated by the insignificance of the differences in means. However, almost one third of the companies of the SBF 
120 index do not have any female directors on their boards in 2009, against nearly 60% in 2000. 41.3% of firms 
included in the SBF 80 have no women on their boards, compared to only 12.5% for the CAC 40 companies.
6
 When 
we examine the number of directorships held by women, we find that the vast majority of SBF 120 companies had 
either one single female director or no female directors on their boards. Similarly, the proportion of firms having 
more than two or three female directors still remains low. Taken together, our results support the continuation of 
tokenism and the glass ceiling among French firms. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The SBF 120 index gathers the 120 largest market capitalizations on Euronext Paris. It is made up of the CAC 40 and the SBF 80. The latter 
includes the SBF 120 securities that are not included in the CAC 40. 
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